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Consuming sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs)
increases the risk of obesity, diabetes, heart
disease, and dental caries1--4 and has been linked
to approximately 184000 deaths per year
worldwide.5 SSBs are also the largest source of
added sugar in the US diet.6,7 Thus, reducing SSB
consumption has been identified as important in
preventing obesity and chronic disease.8--10
Because of the success of tobacco taxation in
reducing smoking prevalence and related dis-
eases,11 public health experts, including the In-
stitute of Medicine, have recommended taxing
SSBs as a means to reduce SSB consumption.12--15
In 2013 and 2014, more than a dozen states and
several cities proposed SSB tax legislation—so
called soda taxes.16 Only 1 proposal passed. On
November 4, 2014, Berkeley, California, passed
a 1-cent-per-ounce specific excise tax on the
distribution of SSBs (Measure D), becoming the
first US city to levy such a tax.17
Measure D is consistent with the type of tax
public health experts have called for—an excise
tax on SSBs.12 Unlike a sales tax, which is added
at the register and paid directly by the con-
sumer, an excise tax is levied before the point of
purchase (e.g., on distributors). Specific excise
taxes are levied per volume of a product,
whereas, ad valorem excise taxes are levied as
a proportion of product price.18 In response to
an excise tax, distributors are expected to
increase SSB prices for retailers, who, in turn,
are expected to increase the shelf prices of SSBs
paid by consumers. Excise taxes are thought to
be more salient to consumers than are sales
taxes because they result in higher shelf prices
at the point of decision, thus deterring pur-
chase.12 The effectiveness of an excise tax in
reducing SSB consumption hinges partly on its
“pass-through rate,” or the extent to which the
tax is passed on to consumers through higher
shelf prices.
In perfectly competitive markets with perfectly
inelastic demand (i.e., changing price does not
change demand), economic theory predicts per-
fect pass-through (i.e., a 1-cent excise tax leads to
a 1-cent retail price increase).19,20 However,
research suggests that demand for SSBs is elas-
tic21; thus, distributors or retailers may undershift
the tax (increase prices by <1 cent/oz), either by
absorbing the costs or distributing costs across
untaxed products (e.g., food or diet soda). In fact,
concerns have been raised that businesses might
undershift the tax and lower their profit margins
to sustain sales (known as “strategic pricing”).22
Undershifting results in lower than expected
price increases, potentially undermining the
public health benefit of a tax.23 However, taxes
may also be overshifted in monopolistic or
oligopolistic markets.20 Empirically, there is evi-
dence of both over- and undershifting of taxes on
cigarettes,24--29 alcohol,30,31 and saturated fat.32
The few empirical studies on SSB excise taxes in
other countries have found pass-through rates
ranging from about 63% to more than 300%,
depending on beverage type, brand, and re-
tailer.33--35 Because Berkeley’s excise tax is the
first of its kind in the nation, there is no empirical
evidence on how such a tax will be passed-
through to consumers in the United States.
We have provided the first early details of the
pass-through of Berkeley’s excise tax on SSBs.
Using neighboring San Francisco and Oakland,
California, as comparison cities, we estimated
the effect of Berkeley’s tax on retail prices of
SSBs. Additionally, we examined price changes
by beverage, brand, size, and retailer type
because research in other countries has found
varying pass-through across these variables.
METHODS
To evaluate the pass-through of Berkeley’s
SSB excise tax, we compared changes in pre-
versus posttax beverage prices in Berkeley to
changes in beverage prices in the comparison
cities Oakland and San Francisco. We selected
these cities because of their proximity to Ber-
keley and their mix of residential and com-
mercial environments. Using a longitudinal
Objectives. We assessed the short-term ability to increase retail prices of the
first US 1-cent-per-ounce excise tax on the distribution of sugar-sweetened
beverages (SSBs), which was implemented in March 2015 by Berkeley, California.
Methods. In 2014 and 2015, we examined pre- to posttax price changes of
SSBs and non-SSBs in a variety of retailers in Berkeley and in the comparison
cities Oakland and San Francisco, California. We examined price changes by
beverage, brand, size, and retailer type.
Results. For smaller beverages (£ 33.8 oz), price increases (cents/oz) in
Berkeley relative to those in comparison cities were 0.69 (95% confidence
interval [CI] = 0.36, 1.03) for soda, 0.47 (95% CI = 0.08, 0.87) for fruit-flavored
beverages, and 0.47 (95% CI = 0.25, 0.69) for SSBs overall. For 2-liter bottles and
multipacks of soda, relative price increases were 0.46 (95% CI = 0.03, 0.89) and
0.49 (95% CI = 0.21, 0.77). We observed no relative price increases for nontaxed
beverages overall.
Conclusions. Approximately 3 months after the tax was implemented, SSB
retail prices increased more in Berkeley than in nearby cities, marking a step in
the causal pathway between the tax and reduced SSB consumption. (Am J
Public Health. 2015;105:2194–2201. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2015.302881)
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design, we assessed prices of the same bever-
ages in the same stores during pre- and posttax
implementation periods.
Measure D levies a tax on the distribution
of beverages with added sugar (equivalent to
‡2 kcals/oz), with the exception of milks
and beverages for medical use.36 Alcoholic
beverages are exempt, and the tax does not
apply to 100% fruit juices, water, or diet
beverages without added sugar.36 Although
Measure D specified an implementation date
of January 1, 2015, implementation was
delayed until the first taxes were collected for
March 2015.37
The primary outcome was change in bever-
age price between pre- and posttax periods. We
collected pretax prices of most beverages in fall
2014 before the November 4, 2014, election.
We collected pretax prices for fruit-flavored
beverages and large sizes of soda from No-
vember 2014 through January 2015, before
implementation. We collected posttax bever-
age prices from late May through June 2015,
approximately 8 months after we collected
most pretax data and approximately 3 months
after the implementation of the tax. Trained
research assistants collected beverage prices by
recording visible prices from price tags. For
beverages without visible prices, data collectors
asked store clerks for prices. If clerks were
uncooperative, data collectors purchased bev-
erages and recorded prices from receipts. If
a temporary promotional price was advertised,
data collectors recorded both the promotional
and regular price.
We collected prices for the following SSB
categories: soda, energy drinks, sports drinks,
sweetened water, presweetened tea, presweet-
ened coffee, and fruit-flavored beverages (not
100% juice). We selected which brands to
examine on the basis of industry reports38,39 of
top-selling beverages in the United States as
well as researcher observations of commonly
sold beverages in the San Francisco Bay Area.
For comparison, we collected the prices of
untaxed beverages: diet versions, reduced fat
milk, water, and 100% orange juice brands
from top-selling soda producers. In all stores,
we collected prices of sizes typically consumed
in a single sitting (e.g., 20-oz sodas) that were
most commonly sold in local stores. We
collected prices of larger sodas (e.g., 2 L)
from a subsample of chain supermarkets and
drugstores. Table 1 lists beverage brands and
sizes for which we obtained prices.
Sampling was driven by a focus on health
disparities. Low-income and minority residents
are more likely to consume SSBs and suffer
related health consequences40,41; thus, in Ber-
keley and San Francisco, we selected 2 large,
low-income neighborhoods with the highest
combined proportion of African American and
Latino residents.42 We selected neighborhoods
in Oakland using census data to most closely
match demographics in the San Francisco
and Berkeley neighborhoods. In each
neighborhood, we selected the highest foot
traffic intersection to facilitate our administra-
tion of intercept surveys assessing beverage
consumption in each neighborhood (for
an ongoing study for which results are not
included here).
Average proportions of African American
and Latino residents living in the intersections’
census tracts were, respectively, 24% and 27%
in Berkeley, 28% and 54% in Oakland, and
26% and 43% in San Francisco; citywide
percentages were 10% and 11% in Berkeley,
28% and 25% in Oakland, and 6% and 15%
TABLE 1—Beverages: Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco, CA; 2014 and 2015
Category Brand Sizea
Regular and diet soda Cokeb 20.0 (12.0) oze
Pepsic 20.0 (12.0) oze
Mountain Dewc 20.0 (12.0) oze
Dr Pepperd 20.0 (12.0) oze
Spriteb 20.0 (12.0) oze
Sports Gatoradec 20.0 (32.0) oz
Energy and diet energy Red Bull 8.4 oz
Regular and diet sweetened water Vitamin Waterb 20.0 oz
Sweetened coffee Bottled Starbucks Frappuccinoc 9.5 (13.7) oz
Fruit flavored (not 100% juice) Arizona 23.0 oz
Briskf 33.8 (24.0) oz
Hawaiian Punchf 20.0 oz
Minute Maid fruit drinksb 15.2 oz
Minute Maid lemonadeb 20.0 oz
Ocean Spray cranberry juice cocktail 15.2 oz
Simply lemonadeb 11.2 oz
Snapple fruit drinksd 16.0 oz
Sunny Delight 16.0 (11.3) oz
Sobe elixirsc 20.0 oz
V8 Splash 16.0 oz
Sweetened tea and diet tea Arizona 23.0 oz
Snappled 16.0 (20.0) oz
Water Aquafinac 20.0 oz
Dasanib 20.0 oz
100% orange juice Minute Maidb 15.2 oz
Tropicanac 12.0 (15.2) oz
2% milk Various 14.0 (16.0) oz
aOr alternate if main size was not available. This applies to a maximum of 3 stores for each beverage with an alternate size
(other than milk). For milk, we collected the alternate size in 5 stores.
bThe Coca-Cola Company.
cPepsiCo.
dDr Pepper Snapple Group.
eFor exploratory analyses, we also collected prices of regular soda sold in 2-L bottles and 12 packs of 12-oz cans (alternate
sizes if 12 packs were not available: 6 packs of 12-oz cans or 6 packs of 16.9-oz bottles).
fPepsi–Lipton Partnership.
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in San Francisco.42 Household median income
for the intersections’ census tracts versus the
city as a whole was $47 000 versus $59 000
in Berkeley, $47 000 versus $50 000 in
Oakland, and $50 000 versus $71 000 in
San Francisco.42
As in previous studies of food enviro-
ments,43,44 we identified beverage retailers
within a 0.5-mile radius of each intersection.
Using a procedure developed by Morland
et al.45 to classify retailers on the basis of the
North American Industry Classification System
code,46 we included chain supermarkets,
drugstores, small grocery stores, liquor stores,
and convenience stores from ReferenceUSA,
a commercial business directory.47 We sam-
pled liquor stores because in the Bay Area they
are also destinations for nonalcoholic beverage
purchases. We limited drugstores sampled to
the 2 chains present in all 3 cities. We also
identified and verified retailers through cor-
porate Web sites, Google Maps, Yellow Pages,
and field observations. To be eligible, retailers
had to stock at least 1 of the 5 top-selling sodas
in the United States.38 We classified retailers
not listed in ReferenceUSA by brand recogni-
tion, keywords (e.g., liquor), or similarity to
other retailers in a category.
We then selected beverage retailers using
a random sample stratified by retailer type to
achieve a minimum of the following near each
intersection: 3 small grocery stores, 2 drug-
stores, 1 convenience store, and 2 liquor stores.
If an insufficient number of retailers in a cate-
gory were located within a 0.5-mile radius, we
sampled the next closest retailer. In Berkeley,
we sampled an additional 2 drugstores and 2
small grocery stores to increase power. Addi-
tionally, we sampled a store from all eligible
chain supermarkets in Berkeley selling 1 of the
5 top-selling sodas (n = 3) and up to 2 super-
markets in those chains in both Oakland and
San Francisco. We also intentionally sampled
7-Elevens in each city (n = 2 per city) because
of their national prevalence. Finally, if we
randomly sampled a chain convenience store
(e.g., Shell), we sampled another retailer in the
same chain from another city.
This sampling approach captured the stores
at which vulnerable populations are likely
to shop—walkable stores in the immediate
neighborhood—as well as popular chains
serving a broader customer base. Table 2 lists
numbers of retailers sampled by city and type. In
Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco, respec-
tively, 14, 11, and 12 stores were chains, and
10, 9, and 9 stores were outside the 0.5-mile
radii (the majority of which were chains).
For small grocery, convenience, and liquor
stores, we sampled 50% of eligible stores in the
selected neighborhoods in Berkeley, 52% in
Oakland, and 31% in San Francisco. On the
basis of ReferenceUSA-verified lists of retailers
with primary North American Industry Classi-
fication System codes corresponding to our
store definitions,47 our sample represented
27%, 6%, and 3% of eligible retailers in
Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco, respec-
tively. However, retailers outside our selected
neighborhoods were not researcher verified, so
the denominators for citywide retailers (which
include stores unlikely to carry top-selling sodas
such as health food stores) may underestimate
the proportion of relevant retailers sampled.
To examine differences between Berkeley
and comparison cities in changes in beverage
prices (i.e., pass-through), we regressed the
difference between post- and pretax prices on
indicators for the presence of the tax and the
retailer type. Separate models examined
relative price changes for specific beverage
categories (regular soda, diet soda, sweetened
tea, fruit-flavored beverages, water, milk,
and orange juice), and the broader categories
of SSBs (regular soda, sweetened tea, sweet-
ened coffee, fruit-flavored beverages, sports
drinks, energy drinks, sweetened water)
and non-SSBs (water, milk, orange juice,
diet versions).
We also examined changes in prices of
regular soda relative to diet soda as well as
prices of SSBs relative to non-SSBs (i.e., change
in SSB price minus change in non-SSB price). In
a sensitivity analysis, we examined whether
promotional prices affected pass-through rates
for soda, fruit-flavored drinks, and SSBs.
We also assessed relative price changes for
specific brands and their diet version (when
available): Coke, Pepsi, Mountain Dew, Dr
Pepper, Sprite, Gatorade, Red Bull, Vitamin
Water, and bottled Starbucks Frappuccino.
Lastly, in exploratory analyses (limited by
sample size), we used stratified models to
examine differences in the pass-through by
retailer type. We also examined differences in
price changes for larger soda sizes, adjusting for
store type. We conducted analyses using Stata/
IC version 13 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX).
RESULTS
Table 3 displays unadjusted baseline bev-
erage prices, pre- to posttax changes in prices,
and differences in price changes between Ber-
keley and comparison cities (i.e., pass-through
estimates) for beverage sizes typically con-
sumed in a single sitting. The increase in the
price of soda in Berkeley over that in compar-
ison cities was 0.69 cents per ounce (95%
CI =0.36, 1.03)—a pass-through rate of 69%.
For fruit-flavored beverages, the pass-through
was lower—0.47 cents per ounce (95%
CI =0.08, 0.87). For sweetened teas, the pass-
through was the lowest: 0.32 cents per ounce
(95% CI = 0.00, 0.65). For SSBs overall, the
pass-through was 0.47 cents per ounce (95%
CI =0.25, 0.69). For categories of nontaxed
TABLE 2—Analytic Sample of Retailers:
Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco,
CA, 2014 and 2015
Retailer Berkeleya Oaklandb San Franciscob
Chain supermarket 3 3 5
Chain 1 1 2 2
Chain 2 1 1 2
Chain 3 1 0 1
Small grocery store 8 6 6
Drugstore 6 4 4
Chain 1 3 2 2
Chain 2 3 2 2
Convenience store 5 5 4
Chain 1 2 2 2
Chain 2 1 1 0
Chain 3 1 1 0
Other 1 1 2
Liquor store 4 4 4
Total 26 22 23
Note. For large sodas (2 L and multipacks), we
sampled 3 chain supermarkets and 2 drugstores in
Berkeley and 5 chain supermarkets and 4 drugstores
in Oakland and San Francisco. This sample includes 1
store per city from each supermarket and drugstore
chain sampled.
aCity with a sugar-sweetened beverage excise tax,
implemented March 2015.
bComparison city without a sugar-sweetened beverage
excise tax.
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beverages, including diet soda, water, milk,
orange juice, and non-SSBs overall, differences
in price changes between Berkeley and the
comparison cities were not significant (range:
---0.16 to 0.22 cents/oz; P> .05). Figure 1
shows price changes for SSBs and non-SSBs
overall and differences in these changes
between Berkeley and comparison cities. In
sensitivity analyses, pass-through rates were
similar when including promotional prices for
soda, fruit-flavored beverages, and SSBs overall
(results not shown).
Table 3 shows results for price increases of
SSBs relative to non-SSBs. The price of regular
soda increased relative to the price of diet soda
by 0.56 cents per ounce (95% CI = 0.24, 0.88)
more in Berkeley than in the comparison cities.
The price of SSBs overall increased relative to
the price of non-SSBs by 0.46 cents per ounce
(95% CI = 0.13, 0.79) more in Berkeley than
in comparison cities.
TABLE 3—Unadjusted Baseline Beverage Prices, Pre- to Posttax Price Changes, and Price Change Differences: Berkeley, Oakland, and San
Francisco, CA, 2014 and 2015
Taxed City: Berkeley Comparison Cities: Oakland and San Francisco
Difference in Change Between
Berkeley and Comparison














Soda 26 8.66 61.08 0.78 60.64 45 8.69 61.07 0.12 60.71 0.69*** (0.36, 1.03)
Diet soda 24 8.80 60.86 0.40 60.49 41 8.66 61.13 0.25 60.80 0.15 (–0.21, 0.50)
Difference in regular and
diet soda
24 0.02 60.29 0.41 60.63 41 0.05 60.49 –0.12 60.61 0.56** (0.24, 0.88)
Sweetened tea 21 6.07 62.06 0.23 60.69 41 6.15 61.56 –0.07 60.51 0.32* (0.00, 0.65)
Fruit-flavored beverages 21 9.50 63.07 0.38 60.93 40 8.65 61.32 –0.11 60.57 0.47* (0.08, 0.87)
Water 12 8.37 61.17 0.45 60.48 23 7.43 61.69 0.31 60.60 0.08 (–0.28, 0.45)
Milk 12 10.58 61.75 0.15 60.54 23 11.14 61.75 –0.09 61.26 0.22 (–0.60, 1.04)
100% orange juice 16 14.47 62.08 0.17 60.90 33 13.27 61.87 0.28 61.61 –0.16 (–1.03, 0.71)
Overall SSBsb 26 10.91 62.09 0.57 60.59 45 10.35 61.48 0.14 60.40 0.47*** (0.25, 0.69)
Overall non-SSBsc 24 12.24 62.63 0.29 60.74 45 11.39 63.12 0.28 60.60 0.00 (–0.32, 0.33)
Difference in SSB and non-SSB 24 –0.99 62.46 0.29 60.75 45 –1.04 62.66 –0.14 60.62 0.46** (0.13, 0.79)
Brands
Coke 26 8.71 61.27 0.87 60.81 44 8.85 61.05 0.07 60.56 0.83*** (0.50, 1.16)
Diet Coke 22 8.74 60.89 0.50 60.55 38 8.82 61.03 0.18 60.52 0.32* (0.02, 0.61)
Pepsi 19 8.90 60.91 0.57 60.53 41 8.79 61.12 0.04 60.85 0.55* (0.11, 0.98)
Diet Pepsi 18 8.95 60.91 0.24 60.34 34 8.89 60.94 0.08 60.63 0.17 (–0.15, 0.50)
Mountain Dew 19 8.94 60.92 0.67 60.74 34 8.79 61.20 0.04 60.79 0.68** (0.24, 1.12)
Diet Mountain Dew 12 9.10 60.79 0.13 60.20 21 9.05 60.79 0.13 60.25 0.02 (–0.12, 0.17)
Dr Pepper 20 8.81 60.76 0.84 60.71 33 8.70 61.07 0.25 60.86 0.56* (0.11, 1.02)
Diet Dr Pepper 12 8.93 60.81 0.35 60.57 24 8.94 60.81 0.23 60.45 0.15 (–0.19, 0.49)
Sprite 21 9.03 61.24 0.79 60.74 39 8.70 61.14 0.16 60.84 0.73** (0.31, 1.15)
Sprite Zero 6 9.21 60.77 0.21 60.25 10 8.54 61.65 0.42 61.23 –0.50 (–1.66, 0.66)
Gatorade 18 8.32 61.04 0.29 60.78 29 7.65 62.05 0.13 60.97 0.19 (–0.39, 0.77)
Vitamin Water 16 9.02 60.76 0.43 60.52 33 8.69 61.86 0.19 61.28 0.42 (–0.21, 1.04)
Vitamin Water Zero 9 9.04 60.85 0.63 60.54 12 8.80 60.79 –0.01 60.75 0.72* (0.02, 1.41)
Starbucks Frappucino 14 26.08 64.87 –0.51 61.76 33 24.64 64.02 0.32 64.00 –1.16 (–3.29, 0.97)
Red Bull 23 28.75 62.92 0.68 62.88 38 27.26 62.70 0.86 62.35 –0.27 (–1.64, 1.11)
Red Bull Sugarfree 20 28.50 62.64 0.38 62.97 32 27.37 62.62 1.00 62.54 –0.53 (–2.10, 1.04)
Note. CI = confidence interval; SSBs = sugar-sweetened beverages.
aEstimate is from linear regression models, adjusting for retailer type in which the dependent variable was price change (posttax price minus pretax price) and the independent variable was
a binomial indicator for tax. We collected posttax prices from late May through June 2015, and we collected most pretax prices in fall 2014 (we collected fruit-flavored beverage prices from
November 2014 through January 2015). Analyses included sizes typically consumed in a single sitting (e.g., 20-oz soda).
bIncludes all regular soda, sweetened teas, fruit-flavored beverages, Gatorade, Vitamin Water, Starbucks Frappucino, and Red Bull.
cIncludes all diet sodas, diet teas, bottled waters, reduced fat milk, 100% orange juice, Vitamin Water Zero, and Red Bull Sugarfree.
*P < .05; **P < .01; ***P < .001.
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Among brands (Table 3), Coke (Coca-Cola
Company) had the highest pass-through (0.83
cents/oz), followed by Sprite (Coca-Cola Com-
pany; 0.73 cents/oz), Mountain Dew (PepsiCo;
0.68 cents/oz), Dr Pepper (Dr Pepper Snapple
Group; 0.56 cents/oz), and Pepsi (PepsiCo;
0.55 cents/oz; P< .05). The price of Diet Coke
also increased significantly in Berkeley relative
to comparison cities (0.32 cents/oz; 95%
CI = 0.02, 0.61). Relative price changes for
other diet sodas (range = ---0.50 to 0.17 cents/
oz), Gatorade (0.19 cents/oz), Red Bull (---0.27
cents/oz), and Vitamin Water (0.42 cents/oz)
were not significant (P> .05).
In exploratory analyses examining pass-
through by retailer type (Table 4), drugstores
generally had the lowest pass-through rates,
with similar, nonsignificant price changes for
regular (0.18 cents/oz) and diet (0.21 cents/
oz) soda, and virtually no price changes for
SSBs and non-SSBs overall in Berkeley rela-
tive to comparison cities (P> .05). For other
retailers, pass-through for soda ranged from
0.59 cents per ounce (95% CI = 0.05, 1.01)
for small grocery stores to 1.35 cents per
ounce (95% CI = ---0.40, 3.10) for liquor
stores. Pass-through for SSBs overall ranged
from 0.42 cents per ounce (95% CI = 0.00,
0.85) in small grocery stores to 0.97 cents
per ounce (95% CI = 0.43, 1.51) in liquor
stores.
Also in exploratory analyses, price increases
for 2-liter bottles and multipacks of regular
soda in Berkeley were 0.46 (95% CI = 0.03,
0.89) and 0.49 (95% CI = 0.21, 0.77) cents
per ounce higher, respectively, than were those
in comparison cities. Pass-through estimates for
these beverages, which we assessed only in
supermarkets and drugstores, were similar to
the pass-through for 20-ounce bottles sold in
supermarkets and drugstores (0.37 cents/oz;
95% CI = 0.13, 0.60). However, when con-
sidering promotional prices, the pass-through
for 2-liter bottles dropped to 0.24 cents per
ounce (95% CI = ---0.46, 0.94), whereas pass-
through for multipacks became 0.56 cents per
ounce (95% CI = ---0.21, 1.34).
DISCUSSION
Approximately 3 months after implementation
of the Berkeley SSB excise tax, we found early
evidence that the tax was passed-through to
higher SSB retail prices, a meaningful step
toward reducing SSB consumption. Pass-through
rates in Berkeley were significant for soda
(69%), fruit-flavored beverages (47%), and
SSBs overall (47%). For soda, this means that
a 20-ounce soda costing $1.75 would cost an
average of $1.89 after the tax (a 14-cent in-
crease). Pass-through was highest for soda, par-
ticularly for Coke (83%). However, the price of
Diet Coke also increased more in Berkeley
than in comparison cities, though by only 39%
of the relative price increase of Coke. Broader
categories of untaxed beverages (diet soda,
water, milk, orange juice, and non-SSBs) did
not significantly increase in price in Berkeley
relative to comparison cities.
At this early stage of implementation, we
found signs of varying pass-through by retailer
type; however, sample size was limited within
retail categories. Drugstores exhibited the low-
est pass-through rates, suggesting that drug-
stores may have used regional (rather than
store-specific) pricing, distributed tax-related
costs across multiple products, or absorbed
costs. By contrast, Dollar Tree, a national chain
selling products for $1, reacted to the tax by
discontinuing SSB sales at its 2 Berkeley loca-
tions in January 2015.48
For larger soda sizes (assessed only in
supermarkets and drugstores), pass-through
rates were lower than for 20-ounce sodas on
average but were similar to the pass-through
rate of 20-ounce sodas from supermarkets
and drugstores. However, when considering
promotional prices, pass-through for 2-liter
bottles was markedly lower. Retailers may have
used temporary promotional pricing to main-
tain SSB demand in the face of SSB taxes.
Because we collected posttax data only 3
months after implementation, we expect to
see further price changes in response to the tax.
When we spoke with managers of nonchain
stores to collect prices, some indicated they
planned to change prices whereas others
were still uncertain about which beverages
were affected and which distributors had
raised prices. One manager noted, “It takes
a lot to add [the cost of a] new tax for every
item. We’re still going through the process, and
it’s June. I think that it would take at least 6
months.” As retailers become more aware of

























Berkeley Comparisona              Adjusted Differenceb
SSBs
non-SSBs
Note. SSB = sugar-sweetened beverage. We estimated price change differences using linear regression models and adjusting
for retailer type. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. We collected posttax prices from late May through June 2015, and
we collected most pretax prices in fall 2014. We collected fruit-flavored beverage prices from November 2014 through
January 2015. Our analyses included sizes typically consumed in a single sitting (e.g., 20-oz soda).
aAbsolute price increases in Oakland and San Francisco.
bDifference in price change between Berkeley and comparison cities.
FIGURE 1—Price changes of SSBs and non-SSBs overall and differences in changes between
Berkeley and comparison cities: Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco, CA; 2014 and 2015.
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distributors, we anticipate pass-through rates
will increase, especially among small grocery
and liquor stores.
Although excise taxes on SSBs have not
been implemented elsewhere in the United
States for public health purposes, other coun-
tries have adopted similar taxes. Effective
January 2014, Mexico’s peso per liter excise
tax on SSBs resulted in a 12% increase in retail
prices of soda35 and a 12% reduction in
purchases of taxed SSBs 1 year later.49 In
January 2012, France implemented an 11-
euro-cent-per-1.5-liter SSB excise tax that was
fully shifted for sodas but undershifted for
fruit drinks and flavored waters 6 months later,
with pass-through rates varying across re-
tailers.33 We observed similar patterns of
higher pass-through for soda and variability
in price changes across retailers. In Denmark,
where excise taxes on soft drinks increased
in 1998 and 2001, researchers also detected
heterogeneity in price changes by retailer as
well as overshifting.34
These previous empirical studies of SSB
tax pass-through have not included concurrent
control communities because taxes were
implemented in an entire country at the same
time.33---35 We compared price changes in
Berkeley to those in nearby cities, allowing
us to account for other factors potentially
affecting beverage prices at the time of imple-
mentation. Another strength of this study is
that we collected most pretax prices before the
November 2014 elections, reducing the likeli-
hood that baseline data were contaminated by
businesses increasing prices in anticipation of
the tax.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. We
assessed beverage prices at only 2 time points
and were unable to assess all beverage types
and sizes or nonbeverage items (e.g., food) to
which retailers could shift costs. Other data,
such as proprietary scanner data, would be
necessary to feasibly analyze a broader set of
products and sizes; however, such data do not
exist for many nonchain stores. Data on
changes in the price that distributors charge
retailers will be necessary to fully understand
pass-through of the tax, because without dis-
tributor price increases, retail price increases
are unlikely.
At least some large distributors, including
a Coke bottler,50 have increased prices, and
our future work will examine variability in
distributor response. Although we examined
pass-through by retailer type, our sample size
limited our ability to test for statistically signif-
icant differences in pass-through by retailer
type. Additionally, in several stores without
price tags, store clerks recalled prices from
memory, which may have introduced random
error into price data. Lastly, our evaluation did
not include all neighborhoods in each city; thus
it is possible our sample does not represent
pass-through in all geographies. However, all
eligible Berkeley supermarket and drugstore
chains and 4 national convenience store
chains were represented. Thus, our sample
contains a mix of centrally located chains
and stores in lower-income, minority
neighborhoods.
Conclusions
Our finding that Berkeley’s SSB excise tax
has already resulted in higher retail prices is of
major public health importance. This first
empirical evidence of early pass-through at the
city level foretells pass-through of SSB excise
taxes in other cities. As the pass-through in
Berkeley evolves and other locations imple-
ment SSB taxes, it will be important to contin-
ually monitor retail prices because higher
prices mediate the effect of excise taxes on
consumption. A recent study estimated that
a 50% to 150% pass-through rate of a 1-cent-
per-ounce excise tax would result in a 10%---
30% reduction in consumption.51 However, it
will be crucial to empirically study changes in
beverage consumption following such taxes,
because this has not yet been done in the
United States or at a city level. Additionally,
future research can explore whether patterns
observed for excise taxes on tobacco, such
as lower pass-through rates in areas near
TABLE 4—Difference in Pre- vs Posttax Beverage Price Changes (Cents/Oz) by Retailer Type: Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco, CA;
2014 and 2015
Supermarket Small Grocery Drugstore Convenience Liquor
Beverage No. b (95% CI)a No. b (95% CI) No. b (95% CI) No. b (95% CI) No. b (95% CI)
Soda 11 0.66** (0.21, 1.11) 20 0.59* (0.11, 1.08) 14 0.18 (–0.05, 0.40) 14 0.86* (0.05, 1.67) 12 1.35 (–0.40, 3.10)
Diet soda 11 0.17 (–0.31, 0.65) 16 –0.05 (–0.82, 0.72) 14 0.21 (–0.06, 0.48) 14 0.55 (–0.19, 1.29) 10 –0.19 (–2.17, 1.79)
Difference in regular and diet soda 11 0.50 (–0.06, 1.05) 16 0.74 (–0.01, 1.50) 14 –0.04 (–0.25, 0.18) 14 0.31 (–0.05, 0.67) 10 1.51 (–0.15, 3.17)
Fruit-flavored drinks 6 0.71 (–1.33, 2.75) 17 –0.07 (–1.07, 0.93) 12 0.13 (–0.29, 0.56) 14 1.04 (–0.02, 2.10) 12 0.83* (0.24, 1.42)
Overall SSBsb 11 0.58 (–0.32, 1.48) 20 0.42 (0.00, 0.85) 14 0.01 (–0.35, 0.37) 14 0.53 (–0.02, 1.08) 12 0.97** (0.43, 1.52)
Overall non-SSBc 11 0.31 (–0.15, 0.76) 18 –0.25 (–0.69, 0.18) 14 –0.08 (–0.59, 0.43) 14 0.49 (–0.18, 1.15) 12 –0.32 (–1.98, 1.33)
Difference in SSB and non-SSB 11 0.27 (–0.61, 1.15) 18 0.65** (0.21, 1.09) 14 0.09 (–0.28, 0.47) 14 0.04 (–0.40, 0.49) 12 1.30 (–0.36, 2.96)
Note. CI = confidence interval; SSBs = sugar-sweetened beverages.
aDifference in price changes between Berkeley and comparison cities. From linear regression models in which the dependent variable was price change (posttax price minus pretax price) and the
independent variable was a binomial indicator for tax. We collected posttax prices from late May through June 2015, and we collected most pretax prices in fall 2014 (we collected fruit-flavored
beverage prices from November 2014 through January 2015). Analyses included sizes typically consumed in a single sitting (e.g., 20-oz soda).
bIncludes all regular soda, sweetened teas, fruit-flavored beverages, Gatorade, Vitamin Water, Starbucks Frappucino, and Red Bull.
cIncludes all diet sodas, diet teas, bottled waters, reduced fat milk, 100% orange juice, Vitamin Water Zero, and Red Bull Sugarfree.
*P < .05; **P < .01; ***P < .001.
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jurisdictions with lower tax rates, occur for SSB
excise taxes.25,29
Of further importance is the health impact of
revenues generated from excise taxes, which
hold great promise as a means to sustainably
fund public health programs. Lastly, under-
standing how and why distributors and re-
tailers react to the tax can inform how other
jurisdictions develop and implement SSB excise
tax legislation. Already results suggest that
more information to retailers before imple-
mentation might lead to quicker and more
complete pass-through. Our ongoing work fo-
cuses on measuring changes in SSB consump-
tion between pre- and posttax periods and
gathers qualitative information about tax
implementation.
Approximately 3 months after implementa-
tion of the Berkeley excise tax on SSBs, we
found early evidence that SSB retail prices
had increased more in Berkeley than in nearby
cities, with soda exhibiting the largest price
increase. Higher SSB retail prices mark
the first step in the causal pathway toward
reduced SSB consumption, which could
considerably reduce the burden of chronic
disease attributed to obesity and other
SSB-related health conditions. j
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